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1Re-examining the Transmission of Monetary Policy:
What More Do a Million Observations Have to Say
Abstract
In this paper we re–examine banks’ lending behavior taking into
account changes in the stance of monetary policy in conjunction with
changes in ﬁnancial sector uncertainty. Using a very large data set
covering all banks in the US between 1979–2000, we show that ﬁ-
nancial sector uncertainty plays an important role in banks’ lending
decisions: overall, small banks tend to lend more than large banks in
times of higher uncertainty, as do less liquid banks in comparison to
more liquid banks across the same size classiﬁcation. We also provide
evidence that the bank lending channel is either not very important
or nonexistent for the US.
JEL: E44, E52, G32.
21 Introduction
Understanding the role of banks in the transmission mechanism of monetary
policy is essential in explaining the eﬀects of a policy change on the aggre-
gate economy. In seeking to evaluate the eﬀects of monetary policy, research
using bank– and ﬁrm–level data has unearthed considerable evidence that
the impact of changes in monetary policy may go beyond the simple text-
book interest rate channel. In particular, Kashyap and Stein (2000, hereafter
KS) used the Federal Reserve System’s Commercial Bank and Bank Holding
Company database to study the impact of monetary policy on bank lending
behavior for banks with diﬀering degrees of liquidity, focusing on the period
between 1976–1993. KS have shown that smaller and less liquid banks would
reduce their loan supply in response to contractionary monetary policy as
their ability to raise reservable forms of ﬁnancing is compromised. As KS
point out, another reason for small banks’ curtailment of loans is that these
banks cannot sell non–reservable liabilities due to a failure of the Modigliani–
Miller proposition. These changes in bank lending behavior, particularly af-
fecting bank–dependent borrowers, would have important implications for
ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing behavior, as their impact is over and above the eﬀects of
changes in interest rates.
In this paper, we re–examine the impact of changes in monetary policy
on bank lending behavior by incorporating ﬁnancial sector uncertainty into
the KS framework. We argue that banks’ lending decision depends not only
on the stance of monetary policy, but will generally be aﬀected by the under-
lying uncertainty in the ﬁnancial sector.1 Proﬁt–maximising banks will make
decisions to extend loans to present or potential customers based on the cur-
rent stance of monetary policy as well as on the uncertainty in the ﬁnancial
sector, over and above the constraints posed by regulatory authorities and
borrowers’ creditworthiness.2 In that sense, current empirical models that
investigate the transmission mechanism of monetary policy may be consid-
ered as misspeciﬁed, and the exclusion of relevant explanatory variables will
1Baum, Caglayan and Ozkan (2002) investigate the impact of macroeconomic uncer-
tainty on the cross sectional distribution of bank lending behavior. They ﬁnd evidence
that during more uncertain times, banks behave more homogeneously, as captured by a
narrowing of the cross–sectional distribution of their loan–to–asset ratio. However, their
study does not indicate how the level of bank lending activity may change as uncertainty
evolves over time.
2Use of the term uncertainty henceforth implies ﬁnancial sector uncertainty.
3lead to biased conclusions.
To achieve our goal, following KS’ strategy, we use the Federal Reserve
System’s Commercial Bank and Bank Holding Company (henceforth BHC)
database which contains information on all banks regulated by the Fed-
eral Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the
Comptroller of the Currency. Our extract of this data set covers essentially
all banks in the U.S. on a quarterly basis from 1979–2000, with 9,000–16,000
observations per quarter.
Our analysis proceeds as follows. After carefully constructing variables as
suggested in KS to eliminate potential deﬁnitional discrepancies, we estimate
the KS model to see if the choice of sample period that we employ in our
analysis qualitatively alters their ﬁndings. Next, we focus on the impact
of uncertainty on bank lending behavior by employing a number of interest
rates and interest rate spreads to generate uncertainty measures from daily
data, using a method originally proposed by Merton (1980).3 Using these
measures of ﬁnancial sector uncertainty, we test whether uncertainty has a
signiﬁcant eﬀect on bank lending behavior for small, intermediate and large
banks with diﬀerent degrees of balance sheet strength.4
Our main ﬁndings can be summarized as follows: we ﬁnd that the degree
of uncertainty has signiﬁcant eﬀects on bank lending behavior not only on its
own (the primary eﬀect) but also through its interaction with the strength
of banks’ balance sheets (the secondary eﬀect). We show that the primary
eﬀect is positive and increasing in bank size. We also ﬁnd that the sensitivity
of bank lending behavior to balance sheet strength declines as the degree of
uncertainty increases. In this context, within each bank size classiﬁcation,
weaker banks (banks with less liquid assets) tend to increase their lending
activity during times of higher uncertainty in comparison to stronger banks
(banks with more liquid assets), possibly lending to more risky projects.
Considering the primary and secondary eﬀects simultaneously, although in-
creased uncertainty leads to an increase in overall lending behavior, we ﬁnd
that small banks increase their lending more than do larger banks. These
results are robust across all uncertainty proxies and bank loan types: total
3Our measures of uncertainty captures the interaction of what the Federal Reserve does
(and might do) with other sources of uncertainty emanating from the ﬁnancial sector, and
possibly from the real sector. Hence, it would not be accurate to consider it merely as
representing monetary policy uncertainty.
4We use several diﬀerent series to generate measures of uncertainty proxies so that we
could demonstrate that our results are not driven by our choice of proxy.
4loans or commercial and industrial (C&I) loans. However, when we sift the
evidence in search for a bank lending channel, we ﬁnd mixed support. Al-
though our broader model conﬁrms the existence of the bank lending channel
when we examine total loans, its economic importance may not be as signif-
icant as KS claim: at least a quarter—and up to a half—of the small banks
behave more like the intermediate banks, with a sensitivity to monetary pol-
icy quite dissimilar to their smaller counterparts. In addition, support for
the lending view completely disappears when we investigate the behavior of
C&I loans: C&I lending behavior of small and large banks seems to be quite
similar in response to changes in the stance of monetary policy.
The rest of the paper is constructed as follows. Section 2 provides a
brief survey of the literature discussing the bank lending channel. Section
3 presents the modeling framework and discusses the methodology we em-
ploy in our investigation. Section 4 documents our empirical ﬁndings, while
Section 5 concludes and draws implications for future research.
2 The Bank Lending Channel
There is now a substantial body of theoretical and empirical literature indi-
cating that monetary policy aﬀects the economy beyond the well known in-
terest rate channel. The intuition for the primary impact of monetary policy,
via the interest rate channel, is that contractionary monetary policy leads to
an increase in real interest rates, causing postponement of consumption and a
reduction of investment spending. However, as Bernanke and Gertler (1995)
pointed out, the impact of monetary policy on the economy is larger than
that implied by the estimates of the interest elasticities of consumption and
investment and they suggest that there must be other mechanisms at work.
One possibility is that, because contractionary monetary policy decreases
the core deposit funding of bank loans through reserve requirements, some
banks would reduce their lending activity, as they may be unable to raise
nonreservable funds to continue lending due to a failure of the Modigliani–
Miller proposition.5 This view is termed the narrow credit channel or the
bank lending channel.
5It is also possible that contractionary monetary policy aﬀects the balance sheets of
the borrowers, by reducing the value of assets and increasing the interest payments, so
that their ability to raise funds from any external source is diminished. This is called the
broad credit channel.
5An earlier study by Bernanke and Blinder (1992) ﬁnds that contractionary
monetary policy leads to a decline in bank lending activity. Though consis-
tent with the lending view, this study is criticized on the grounds that the use
of aggregate data may confound a reduction in the supply of loans with re-
duced loan demand. Subsequently, Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993, 1996)
show that a monetary contraction increases the issuance of commercial paper.
This evidence suggests that any reduction in observed lending is not due to
a reduction in loan demand, but rather reﬂects a reduction in loan supply.6
Also, Calomiris, Himmelberg, and Wachtel (1995) show that during peri-
ods of monetary contraction, commercial paper–issuing ﬁrms increase trade
credit extended by these ﬁrms, suggesting that larger ﬁrms take up some of
the slack created as their smaller customers lose access to bank loans. Along
similar lines, Nielsen (2002) concentrates on the use of trade credit by small
ﬁrms (which is available to all customers, but at penalty rates) and shows
that small ﬁrms use trade credit more heavily during periods of monetary
contraction, supporting the evidence of a bank lending channel.7
Turning now to studies on bank lending behavior, Peek and Rosengren
(1995) and Stein (1998) point out that poorly capitalized banks and those
that carry bad loans on their books, respectively, will suﬀer reduced ac-
cess to markets for uninsured funding, and their lending behavior will be
more dependent on monetary shocks. A more inﬂuential study conducted
by Kashyap and Stein (2000) employed the BHC database to ﬁnd that the
impact of monetary policy on bank lending activity is stronger, in particu-
lar, for small banks with less liquid balance sheets. Similarly, utilizing the
approach developed by KS, researchers using European bank–level data have
also begun to provide evidence in support of the bank lending channel. For
example, Worms (2001) uses monthly balance sheet data for 1992–1998 cov-
ering all German banks to ﬁnd evidence compatible with the lending view.8
6Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) show that large ﬁrms’ bank lending actually increases,
while small ﬁrms suﬀer from reductions in the growth rate of bank loans outstanding.
Therefore, it could be that reduction in bank loans to small ﬁrms could be driven by a
lower demand for credit.
7Nielsen also ﬁnds that larger ﬁrms increase their trade credit use and explains this
phenomena as an issue of the “ﬂight to quality” as proposed by Bernanke, Gertler and
Gilchrist (1996).
8See references therein.
63 Assessing the Bank Lending Channel Un-
der Uncertainty
In this study we aim to broaden our understanding of banks’ lending be-
havior due to changes in the stance of monetary policy in conjunction with
changes in ﬁnancial sector uncertainty by extending the basic KS model. In
a setting with no uncertainty, it would be suﬃcient to investigate the impact
of key indicators of macroeconomic performance to understand the behavior
of economic agents. More realistically, one must be concerned with second
moments (uncertainty about the course of the macroeconomy, the volatil-
ity of interest rates, or more generally ﬁnancial sector volatility) along with
the ﬁrst moments. These second–moment eﬀects may be of key relevance
to economic policymakers, as they may have a sizable inﬂuence on commer-
cial banks’ decision making process. Therefore, it is crucial to evaluate the
degree to which ﬁnancial sector uncertainty will aﬀect banks’ willingness to
utilize available loanable funds. However, the existing literature containing a
variety of evidence in support of the bank lending channel has not considered
the impact of uncertainty. In this paper, we seek to demonstrate that uncer-
tainty has important eﬀects on bank lending behavior, and that a model of
the transmission mechanism of monetary policy which ignores the primary
and secondary eﬀects of uncertainty could be seriously misspeciﬁed in their
absence.9
KS follow two diﬀerent appproaches, labelled as the two–step model and
the one–step model. Since they ﬁnd that the two–step approach “probably
errs on the side of being overparameterized” (2000, p. 421), we will focus on






















where Lit is a bank-level measure of lending activity, Bit is a measure of
9The models employed in many of the bank–level empirical studies that have followed
in KS’ footsteps are subject to the same criticism.
7balance sheet strength, and Mt is a monetary policy indicator. Time eﬀects
are captured by TIMEt and QUARTERkt dummies and FRBik captures
geographical eﬀects via Federal Reserve district dummies. KS also consider





























and term it the bivariate speciﬁcation, diﬀering from the univariate model by
the introduction of GDPt to control for changes in overall economic activity.
In both of these models, KS are interested in the coeﬃcient of ∆Mt−j
interacted with Bit−1. Intuitively, the less liquid bank will reduce its loans
if its lost insured deposits due to a contractionary monetary shock cannot
be replenished by other forms of ﬁnance. Hence, one would expect to see
∂2Lit/∂Bit∂Mt < 0 for less liquid banks. To test this hypothesis, they
focus on how small and large banks diﬀer from each other in their abil-
ity to raise uninsured forms of ﬁnancing, without frictions. KS claim that
∂3Lit/∂Bit∂Mt∂SIZEit > 0 is an eﬀect of size. The sign of the third deriva-
tive can be interpreted as implying that the eﬀect of contractionary monetary
policy will be strongest for the smallest banks, while the largest banks will
be less sensitive, since they have better access to the market for uninsured
funds.
Nevertheless, these approaches fail to take into account the fact that
loans to private borrowers exhibit both market risk and default risk, with
the latter risk correlated, in many cases, with macroeconomic conditions, as
well as to ﬁnancial–market outcomes such as movements in the cost of short–
term funds.10 In that sense, we argue that the KS model omits an important
variable: ﬁnancial sector uncertainty. Such an omission will lead to biased
and inconsistent estimates of the model’s parameters, and in particular of the
10A simple portfolio optimization model, in which the bank manager must rebalance her
asset portfolio to maintain an appropriate level of risk and expected return, would imply
that a bank would be expected to reduce its exposure to risky loans in the face of greater
perceived uncertainty, and the resulting likelihood of borrowers’ default.
8eﬀects of monetary policy on banks’ behavior. To overcome this problem, we






























































In these speciﬁcations, a proxy for ﬁnancial sector uncertainty, σ(M)t, is
integrated into the simple KS approach. Note that σ(M)t appears both by
itself and in conjunction with a measure of balance sheet strength, Bt. The
latter interaction term allows us to evaluate whether the eﬀect of uncertainty
on bank lending behavior diﬀers with respect to the bank’s liquidity, whereas
the former term captures the direct eﬀect of uncertainty. We also investigate
the impact of size eﬀects on this relationship. Furthermore, by employing
this speciﬁcation, we can determine whether KS’ results are biased; signiﬁ-
cant coeﬃcients on the σ(M)t terms would imply that uncertainty has been
mistakenly omitted from their speciﬁcation.
3.1 Identifying Financial Sector Uncertainty
Any attempt to evaluate the eﬀects of uncertainty σ(M)t on the bank lending
behavior requires speciﬁcation of a measure of risk. In this study, we utilize
several diﬀerent series derived from daily interest rates to generate measures
9of monetary policy volatility. This approach allows us to check the robust-
ness of our results and examine whether our results are driven by the choice
of a speciﬁc uncertainty proxy. The series we employ to generate a measure
of uncertainty include both levels and spreads of daily interest rates from
Treasury and private markets, accessed from the DRI–Global Insight Basic
Economics database. The levels include the rates on Federal funds, three–
month Treasury bills, one–year, ﬁve–year and ten–year Treasury constant
maturity series, and three–month commercial paper. Three term spreads
are considered: one–year Treasury versus Federal funds, ﬁve–year Treasury
versus three-month bill, and ten–year versus one–year Treasury rates. In ad-
dition, we consider a risk spread: three–month commercial paper versus the
three–month Treasury bill. Below we describe how we generated a monetary
policy uncertainty measure from each of these series.
3.1.1 Generating volatility measures from daily data
A number of competing approaches for the construction of volatility mea-
sures may be found in the empirical literature. The choice of a particular
speciﬁcation to generate uncertainty may have a considerable impact on the
empirical ﬁndings, since counterintuitive results may be merely reﬂecting er-
rors of measurement in a proxy for risk. It is possible to employ a simple
moving standard deviation of the policy series, at the same frequency as the
data: for instance, including the past four or eight quarters’ of changes in
the context of quarterly data. However, this measure gives rise to substantial
serial correlation in the summary measure. A more sophisticated approach
utilises the ability of GARCH models to mimic the “volatility clustering”
often found in high-frequency ﬁnancial series. However, a GARCH model
ﬁtted to monthly or quarterly data may ﬁnd very weak persistence of shocks.
In this study we use (squared) daily changes in the series to capture
that quarter’s volatility, following a procedure originally proposed by Merton
(1980) to better represent the uncertainty facing economic agents. In order to
employ the Merton methodology to the problem at hand, we must evaluate
the intra-quarterly volatility of the series from daily data. We ﬁrst take
the squared ﬁrst diﬀerence of that measure (after dividing by the square
root of the number of days intervening), which we then deﬁned as the daily










10where the denominator expresses the eﬀect of calendar time elapsing between
observations on the x process. If data were available every calendar day,
∆φt = 1,∀t, but given that data are not available on weekends and holidays,
∆φt ∈ (1,5). The estimated quarterly volatility of the monetary policy series
is deﬁned as Φt [xt] =
qPT
t=1 ςd
t where the time index for σt [xt] is at the
quarterly frequency.11
3.2 Identifying Monetary Policy Stance
In the context of our study, it is essential to accurately evaluate the stance
of monetary policy. A simple approach is to keep track of the changes in the
stock of money, but this may be misleading, as the Federal Reserve aims at
smoothing short–term interest rates. The problems with this simple approach
have led researchers to develop alternative methods for identifying the stance
of policy. Although no clear consensus has emerged, some approaches have
been highlighted in the recent literature. We have chosen to employ one of
the methods used in KS’ work, the method developed by Bernanke and Mihov
(1998), to measure the overall stance of U.S. monetary policy via a ﬂexible
VAR. We construct the VAR system as described in Bernanke–Mihov’s work




We utilize the Federal Reserve System’s Commercial Bank and Bank Holding
Company database, covering essentially all banks in the U.S. on a quarterly
basis from 1979–2000. We would note that the degree of concentration in the
U.S. banking industry—increasing considerably over the period we study—
implies that a very large fraction of the observations in the “all banks” data
11See Baum, Caglayan and Ozkan (2004) for a more detailed discussion of the procedure
along with its merits, and an application on the link between exchange rate volatility and
international trade.
12Comparison of our computed Bernanke–Mihov measure over the longer sample and
that published in their article (which ends in 1997) indicates that the two series are similar.
11set are associated with quite small, local institutions.13 Using this data set
we construct our key variables following the recommendation provided in
KS’ appendix to ensure consistency and eliminate any potential deﬁnitional
discrepancies.14
We provide basic descriptive statistics on our variables in Table 1. The
number of observations referenced is the number of bank–quarters in the
panel. The ﬁrst several lines, labeled as interest rates or spreads, are our
constructed measures of uncertainty (σ(M)t), while ∆mbmt represents the
Bernanke–Mihov measure of the stance of monetary policy. The dependent
variable in our model is the growth rate of total loans or commercial and in-
dustrial (C&I) loans, for which considerably fewer observations are available.
Finally, the Bt variable measures the strength of a bank’s balance sheet. The
following panels of Table 1 present the bank–speciﬁc variables for the small,
intermediate, and large size categories, respectively, for both total loans and
C&I loans. The thresholds for these deﬁnitions are the 95th and 99th per-
centile of total assets, evaluated each quarter; thus a particular bank may
appear in diﬀerent categories over time.
It may be noted that the small banks (in terms of average or median
values) have the most liquid balance sheet, with large banks having just over
half as large a value for B. Conversely, small banks have the lowest growth
rate of loans. This observation holds whether we concentrate on the behavior
of total loans (approximately one million observations) or that of C&I loans
(approximately 500,000 observations). That is, the the growth rates of both
total loans and C&I loans, on average, are greater for large banks than they
are for intermediate and small banks.
In the following subsections, we present our results. We ﬁrst consider
the univariate and bivariate KS models over our lengthier sample. We then
integrate ﬁnancial sector uncertainty into their original speciﬁcation and in-
vestigate its impact on bank lending behavior for small, medium and large
banks. All analyses were performed for each of the ten volatility series de-
scribed above. For brevity, we present results for four of those cases: the
three–month Treasury bill, the ﬁve–year Treasury note, the risk spread (CP
13There were over 15,000 banks required to ﬁle condition reports in the late 1970s. By
2000Q4, the number of reporting banks fell to 9,261.
14We carry out our analysis on the level of the individual bank throughout this paper.
We do not aggregate the balance sheets of banks into their holding companies. In their
analysis, KS did not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the analysis of individual banks
versus the analysis of bank holding company balance sheets.
12over TB) and the ten year–one year Treasury term spread.
4.2 Replicating the KS model
We start our investigation by replicating the KS analysis using our longer
data set and examine whether changes in monetary policy have an eﬀect on
the sensitivity of lending activity to balance sheet strength, ∂2Lit/∂Bit∂Mt,
for small, intermediate and large size classes. Hence, similar to KS, we
create small, intermediate and large size classes based on banks’ total asset
distribution. Small banks are those whose total assets are less than the 95th
percentile; intermediate banks’ assets range between the 95th percentile and
the 99th percentile; large banks’ assets are above the 99th percentile. Then,
we ran the basic univariate and the bivariate models given in equations (1)
and (2).
To discuss our ﬁndings and be able to compare them with that of KS, for
each model, we compute the sum of the φ coeﬃcients on the monetary policy
indicator (labeled B ·MPI), and also present the eﬀects of changes in GDP
captured through the sum of the γ in the bivariate speciﬁcation for each size
category (labeled B · GDP).15 Tables 2 and 3, respectively, give the results
for total and C&I loans using the standard KS approach. In comparison
to those results presented in KS (2000, Table 5, Panel B, p. 422), results
for total loans depicted in Table 2 show that the summary measure for φ is
signiﬁcantly negative for small banks in both speciﬁcations.16 Also observe
that the coeﬃcient estimate for φ becomes larger (in absolute value) when
changes in GDP are introduced to control for the state of the economy. While
the same coeﬃcient is insigniﬁcant for large banks when the univariate model
is used, it is positive and signiﬁcant for the bivariate model. For intermediate
banks, we consistently obtain a positive coeﬃcient which is signiﬁcant under
the bivariate model. The results for C&I loans are similar to those for total
loans. The coeﬃcient estimates for φ are negative and signiﬁcant for small
banks in both speciﬁcations. Coeﬃcients for intermediate and large banks
are insigniﬁcant for univariate (both negative) and bivariate (both positive)
speciﬁcations. Overall, both sets of results conﬁrm and support the existence
15Recall that we measure the stance of monetary policy using only the Bernanke–Mihov
approach, and compare our results with those corresponding in KS.
16Note that the KS coeﬃcient estimate of φ for total loans is insigniﬁcant for the bivariate
model.
13of the bank lending channel for our extended sample, although the estimates
of φ are smaller than those reported in KS’ Table 5.
4.3 The modiﬁed KS model: Investigating the eﬀects
of uncertainty
Our next set of results utilizes equations (3) and (4) in which we incorporate
the eﬀect of uncertainty for each size class. In particular, we examine whether
uncertainty has an impact on bank lending behavior and also whether this
impact changes depending on banks’ balance sheet strength, ∂Lit/∂σ(M)t
and ∂2Lit/∂Bit∂σ(M)t, using the same size classiﬁcations. Addition of these
new variables into the standard KS model is essential to broaden our un-
derstanding on the banks’ role in the transmission of monetary policy, since
economic agents hardly ignore the impact of uncertainty in their decision–
making process. Furthermore, omission of these second–moment eﬀects may
lead to erroneous conclusions due to model misspeciﬁcation. In the subsec-
tions below we will initially concentrate on the behavior of total loans and
then turn to that of C&I loans.
4.3.1 The extended univariate speciﬁcation for total loans
In Table 4, we present our results for the modiﬁed univariate model, equa-
tion (3), which uses the growth of total loans as the dependent variable and
employs four diﬀerent measures of uncertainty, respectively based on the
three–month Treasury bill, the ﬁve–year Treasury note, the risk spread (CP
over TB) and the ten year–one year Treasury term spread.17 The table lays
out the sum of the φ coeﬃcients on the monetary policy indicator (labeled
B · MPI) in conjunction with the bank’s balance sheet strength, the sum
of λ on uncertainty, σ(M)t (labeled σ), and the sum of ξ on uncertainty in
conjunction with bank balance sheet strength Bitσ(M)t (labeled B·σ), for all
size categories. For each uncertainty measure and size category, inspection
of estimates for φ reveals that the coeﬃcients’ signs and their magnitudes
are similar, albeit generally smaller, than those presented in Table 2. Hence,
these results provide support for the bank lending channel. The smaller (ab-
solute) magnitudes of the φ coeﬃcients may indicate that the corresponding
17Results obtained using the other six volatility series are qualitatively similar to those
presented here, and are available upon request from the authors.
14estimates in Table 2 are biased upward due to the omission of the eﬀects of
uncertainty.
Next, we turn our attention to understanding the relationship between
bank lending and ﬁnancial sector uncertainty, and investigate the remaining
sets of coeﬃcients: the sum of λ estimates (labeled σ) and the sum of ξ es-
timates (labeled B ·σ). The sum of λ estimates on uncertainty is signiﬁcant
and positive for all size groups, irrespective of the uncertainty measure used,
with its magnitude monotonically increasing as bank size increases. This re-
sult suggests that during times of greater uncertainty larger banks can lend
more in comparison to smaller banks, as captured by the sum λ. However,
the story does not end here. Uncertainty can also aﬀect banks’ lending be-
havior through its interaction with the strength of the bank balance sheet.
We ﬁnd that the sign of the derivative ∂2Lit/∂Bit∂σ(M)t is negative, which
implies that the sensitivity of bank lending to balance sheet strength is neg-
atively related to an increase in uncertainty. In other words, as uncertainty
increases, banks with less liquid assets (weaker banks) tend to reduce their
loans, but by a lesser amount than do banks with more liquid assets (stronger
banks). This clearly implies greater risk–taking behavior by banks with weak
balance sheets. The monotonic behavior of the same coeﬃcient across size
groups indicates that larger banks react more to an increase in uncertainty
by reducing their loans. Obviously, the overall impact of uncertainty on bank
lending will be related to the sums of λ and ξ estimates, and the long–run ef-
fect will depend on all of these coeﬃcients for a given degree of balance sheet
strength. We will explain in detail the total long–run eﬀect of uncertainty in
the following sections.
4.3.2 Results based on a ﬁner classiﬁcation for total loans
Given our ﬁndings for total loans in Table 4, we further split small banks into
subgroups to see whether or not the relationship we have so far portrayed
holds for a ﬁner classiﬁcation. To that end we break up small banks into
four subgroups: the smallest group (small0) contains banks with total assets
below the 25th percentile, the next group (small1) includes banks from the
25th to the 50th percentile, the third group (small2) encompasses banks
between the 50th and the 75th percentile, and the largest group (small3)
contains those banks above the 75th percentile. We ran equation (3) using
this new classiﬁcation, for which results are presented in Table 5.
A quick glance at the table yields the basic message that the impact of
15uncertainty, as summarized in the sums of λ and ξ estimates, is also mono-
tonic across subgroups of small banks. Furthermore, the estimated sum of
φ is negative, implying the existence of the bank lending channel when we
use growth in total loans as the dependent variable. A more closer investi-
gation of the table, though, reveals that the distinction between small and
intermediate banks may be somewhat misleading. For instance, considering
the sum of the coeﬃcient estimates for φ, we may note that banks in the
small3 subgroup—comprising 20% of the population—seem to behave quite
similarly to those in the intermediate group presented in Table 4. Hence,
although the bank lending channel is present for total loans, its economic
signiﬁcance may not be as strong as KS have argued, even though their
claims are based on ‘the most conservative coeﬃcient estimates’ (2000, p.
422). Turning now to the impact of uncertainty on lending behavior, we
note that the estimates of ξ are insigniﬁcant for the small0 category for all
measures of uncertainty. This observation indicates that banks within the
small0 subgroup will react diﬀerently in their lending behavior from those in
the other subgroups to a change in uncertainty.
In Table 6, we provide the total long–run eﬀects of uncertainty on lending
behavior for each size category. Note that these tables are constructed using
the information given in Tables 4 and 5 when the the measure of uncertainty
is based on the three–month Treasury bill.18 The ﬁrst three columns of
Table 6 report the 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles of bank’ balance sheet
strength (liquidity) across all size categories. The next three columns lay
out the total long–run sensitivity of lending behavior to bank strength with
respect to changes in uncertainty. For example, we compute Total[σ|Bp25] =
P4




where Bp25 is the level of banks’ balance sheet
strength measured at the 25th percentile, and the sums of λ and ξ estimates
are those presented in Tables 4 and 5, within each subgroup. All other entries
are computed similarly.
Given this background, we can now interpret our results. Let us ﬁrst
consider the information in the rows of these tables. Reading across a row,
P4
j=0 λj is constant within each size group, so that each row is simply cap-
turing the eﬀect of the interaction term, ∂2Lit/∂Bit∂σ(M)t, evaluated at
diﬀering levels of B. Recall that the sign of this term is negative for all
classes, except for small0, meaning that an increase in uncertainty reduces
the sensitivity of lending to bank strength. In other words, an increase in
18Use of other measures of uncertainty produces similar observations.
16σ(M)t will lead to a reduction in bank lending as B increases, except for
banks in the small0 class. That is exactly what we observe in Table 6. In
the case of the smallest group, the opposite phenomena is portrayed; the
smallest banks increase their lending activity under uncertainty only if their
balance sheet strengthens. The implication of this ﬁnding is that within
each size group, banks with weaker balance sheets lend more during times of
higher uncertainty, taking on more risk. This result is quite understandable
from the theory of real options, in the presence of deposit insurance: the
option to take a larger gamble becomes more valuable in the face of greater
underlying uncertainty.
We can also read the table from top to bottom, noting that several factors





j=0 ξj are changing across classes, as are the
levels of B (note from the ﬁrst three columns that B declines as the bank size
increases). In such circumstances, it is possible to obtain any kind of ordering
for lending behavior amongst bank classes. Even then, Table 6 presents us
with a remarkable observation: the total eﬀect of uncertainty on bank lending
behavior is generally declining as we move from the small0 to intermediate
classes. Furthermore, moving from the ﬁrst entry of small0 banks to the last
entry for large banks, the eﬀect of uncertainty on lending drops from 0.0098
to 0.0029. This observation implies that smaller banks tend to lend more
in times of uncertainty in comparison to their larger counterparts, taking on
more risk in the process. It is possible that since large banks’ more sizable
loan portfolios allow for diversiﬁcation, small banks’ risk proﬁle may be higher
than that of large banks, as the small banks may make more fewer, more
geographically–concentrated loans. Hence, our results may reﬂect the fact
that prudently–managed large banks lend on average to less risky borrowers
than do their smaller counterparts.
4.3.3 The extended bivariate speciﬁcation for total loans
As a next step, we present our bivariate regression results for small, intermediate
and large bank classes and subgroups for the small banks in tables 7 and
8, respectively. Overall, results from both tables support our ﬁndings de-
picted in tables 4 and 5. Inspecting Table 7, we see that φ is negative and
signiﬁcant for small banks, positive and signiﬁcant for intermediate banks
and positive, but insigniﬁcant, for large banks. Furthermore, estimates in
Table 8 show that the sign of φ for small0 and small1 are consistently neg-
17ative. However, there is now a stronger case for the small3 category—those
between the 75th and 95th percentile of the size distribution—to be included
in the intermediate group, given the similarity of their behavior. In a similar
line of argument, now it appears that one may want to include banks in the
small2 category (i.e., all those above the median level of total assets) into
the intermediate class.
Overall we can argue that there is evidence in favor of the bank lending
channel, although its economic signiﬁcance may not be nearly as large as
KS proposed. KS state that the sensitivity of lending behavior to monetary
policy is clearly aﬀected by balance sheet strength, and that this “result is
largely driven by the smaller banks, those in the bottom 95 percent of the
size distribution.” (2000, p. 407). Our disaggregation of the size distribution
reveals that many of these ‘smaller’ banks are by no means homogeneous in
their sensitivity to monetary policy shocks. Evidence for strong and consis-
tent eﬀects of ﬁnancial sector uncertainty is also apparent: the monotonic
relationship still exists, and the signs and magnitudes of the estimated coef-
ﬁcients are qualitatively similar to those in Tables 4 and 5.
In Table 9, we provide the long–run eﬀects of uncertainty on total loans
similar to that in Table 6. Comparing Table 9 with Table 6, we obtain similar
conclusions, conﬁrming our previous ﬁndings: small banks tend to lend more
than large banks in times of heightened uncertainty, as do less–liquid banks
in comparison to more–liquid banks across the same size classiﬁcation (with
the exception of banks in the small0 size category).
4.3.4 The extended bivariate speciﬁcation for C&I loans
Due to space considerations, we will only concentrate on estimates obtained
from the bivariate speciﬁcation for C&I loans. Table 10 presents those re-
sults.19 Interestingly, we ﬁnd no evidence in support of the bank lending
channel. Inspecting the sum of φ estimates, we see that it is no longer nega-
tive for small banks. It turns out that the sign of φ for all categories is now
positive and insigniﬁcant, refuting the existence of a bank lending channel.
This result is very surprising and signals that earlier research searching for
a bank lending channel is subject to a severe model misspeciﬁcation due to
omission of these second–moment eﬀects.
19Results from the univariate speciﬁcation are very similar to that of the bivariate model
and available upon request from the authors.
18Next we concentrate our attention on the relationship between banks’
C&I loan activity and ﬁnancial sector uncertainty. Evidence for strong and
consistent eﬀects of ﬁnancial sector uncertainty is apparent. The sum of λ on
uncertainty is signiﬁcant and positive for all size groups, irrespective of the
uncertainty measure used. Furthermore, the sum of the coeﬃcients of ξ, is
negative for all size groups. For both sets of coeﬃcients we see a monotonic
behavior similar as in the total loans case.
4.3.5 Results based on a ﬁner classiﬁcation for C&I loans
We carry out our analysis for C&I loans using a ﬁner classiﬁcation for small
banks to be consistent with our earlier approach. Overall, ﬁndings presented
in Table 11 provide no surprises. The coeﬃcient estimate for the sum of φ,
similar to the earlier case, is either insigniﬁcant or, in some cases, positive
and signiﬁcant, refuting the existence of a bank lending channel. As we turn
to evidence in search of eﬀects of uncertainty, we ﬁnd that the sum of λ
estimates and the sum of ξ estimates are signiﬁcant and we can still observe
a monotonic progression as we move from small0 to small3 similar to that
for total loans.
Finally, Table 12 provide the total long–run eﬀect of uncertainty on lend-
ing behavior. When we read Table 12 for each size classiﬁcation across rows,
we see once again that banks with weaker balance sheets lend more compared
to those with stronger balance sheets during times of higher uncertainty. Al-
ternatively, when we inspect the table from top to bottom, we observe that
the total eﬀect of uncertainty is generally declining as we move from small0
to intermediate banks. In particular, moving from the ﬁrst entry of small0
banks to the last entry for intermediate banks, the eﬀect of uncertainty
on lending drops from 0.0426 to 0.0190.20 Overall, the results in this table
clearly demonstrate that smaller banks tend to extend more C&I loans in
times of uncertainty than larger banks, as do weaker banks in comparison to
their stronger counterparts, taking on more risk in the process.
20Also note that the last entry for large banks, 0.0348, is smaller than that of the ﬁrst
entry of small banks, although the eﬀect for large banks does not drop as much as it does
in the case of total loans.
195 Conclusions
In this paper we re–examine the eﬀects of changes in the stance of monetary
policy on banks’ lending activities by incorporating the impact of ﬁnancial
sector uncertainty. Similar to Kashyap and Stein, we concentrate on the
growth rates of total loans and commercial and industrial loans for various
size categories. To carry out our investigation, we use the Federal Reserve
System’s Commercial Bank and Bank Holding Company database which con-
tains information on all banks regulated by the Federal Reserve System, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Comptroller of the Currency.
Our data set covers the period between 1979–2000 on a quarterly basis, with
9,000–16,000 observations per quarter.
Using our longer data set, we ﬁrst conﬁrm the existence of the bank
lending channel for both total and commercial and industrial loans running
standard speciﬁcations used by Kashyap and Stein. We then extend the
model by incorporating the eﬀects of ﬁnancial sector uncertainty. Using this
broader model, we show that overall uncertainty has a positive impact on
lending activities across all bank classiﬁcations. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that
smaller banks increase their lending more than larger banks, and that weaker
banks (banks with less–liquid assets) tend to lend more than stronger banks
(banks with more–liquid assets) during times of higher uncertainty. These
results are robust to use of diﬀerent measures of uncertainty.
Our analysis reveals further surprising results. We show that earlier re-
search searching for a bank lending channel is subject to model misspeciﬁca-
tion: researchers may have arrived at erroneous conclusions due to omission of
these second–moment eﬀects, whose importance is evident in our estimates.
The estimated sensitivity of bank lending to monetary policy shocks—the
sum of φ coeﬃcients–changes considerably when uncertainty is taken into
account, suggesting that prior estimates may be biased.
Our empirical evidence leads us to believe that although the behavior of
banks’ total loan activity provides support for a bank lending channel, its
economic signiﬁcance may not be as large as previously claimed, since at
least a quarter—and up to a half—of the small banks behave more like the
intermediate banks, with a sensitivity to monetary policy quite dissimilar to
their smaller counterparts. Furthermore, when we turn our attention to C&I
loans, we can ﬁnd no evidence in favor of a bank lending channel: the eﬀects of
balance sheet strength and the stance of monetary policy on lending behavior
no longer varies across bank size categories. This ﬁnding contradicts the basic
20intuition of the bank lending view that small, weak banks lacking access to the
market for non–reservable funds should reduce their lending more than their
stronger counterparts during episodes of monetary contraction. Overall, our
ﬁndings call for more empirical research, for example using European data
to see whether ﬁnancial sector uncertainty has any eﬀect on bank lending,
and consider whether the bank lending channel indeed exists.
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23Table 1: Descriptive statistics
N µ σ p25 p50 p75
3-month TBill 70.1770 63.0378 32.3116 46.1210 72.3064
5-year Treasury 61.6596 30.7729 40.8401 49.3423 67.9509
CP-TB spread 78.0399 76.5679 34.4634 46.6486 74.5969
10 yr–1 yr Treas. spread 44.5795 29.3139 27.1155 33.4489 47.5641
∆mbm 0.0006 0.0283 -0.0105 -0.0004 0.0071
(A) Total Loans
All banks
∆logtotloans 1,087,683 0.0239 0.0877 -0.0126 0.0175 0.0501
B 0.3317 0.1523 0.2249 0.3181 0.4272
Small banks
∆logtotloans 1,041,487 0.0238 0.0866 -0.0127 0.0174 0.0501
B 0.3359 0.1516 0.2294 0.3224 0.4313
Intermediate banks
∆logtotloans 36,707 0.0270 0.1107 -0.0096 0.0187 0.0496
B 0.2498 0.1412 0.1616 0.2405 0.3255
Large banks
∆logtotloans 9,489 0.0303 0.1032 -0.0089 0.0206 0.0527
B 0.1880 0.1007 0.1170 0.1813 0.2444
(B) Commercial and Industrial Loans
All banks
∆logC&Iloans 498,353 0.0261 0.1913 -0.0468 0.0176 0.0899
B 0.3228 0.1401 0.2278 0.3115 0.4079
Small banks
∆logC&Iloans 476,472 0.0259 0.1934 -0.0482 0.0173 0.0910
B 0.3267 0.1398 0.2319 0.3153 0.4118
Intermediate banks
∆logC&Iloans 17,231 0.0291 0.1422 -0.0258 0.0206 0.0722
B 0.2510 0.1173 0.1773 0.2480 0.3228
Large banks
∆logC&Iloans 4,560 0.0326 0.1205 -0.0196 0.0241 0.0681
B 0.1846 0.0920 0.1178 0.1728 0.2374
Note: N refers to the number of bank–quarters in the category. p25, p50
and p75 represent the quartiles of the distribution of each variable, while µ
and σ are the mean and standard deviation.
24Table 2: One–step estimates for total loans: sums of coeﬃcients on monetary
policy indicator and GDP growth
Univariate Bivariate
Size [N] B · MPI B · MPI B · GDP
Small (< p95) -0.470 -0.516 -0.697
[964,669] (0.074) (0.107) (0.187)
Intermediate (p95 − p99) 0.956 3.231 6.090
[33,603] (0.716) (0.980) (1.735)
Large (> p99) -3.085 0.454 9.445
[8,832] (1.395) (1.999) (3.343)
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table 3: One–step estimates for C&I loans: sums of coeﬃcients on monetary
policy indicator and GDP growth
Univariate Bivariate
Size [N] B · MPI B · MPI B · GDP
Small (< p95) -2.018 -0.971 1.949
[398,117] (0.269) (0.401) (0.649)
Intermediate (p95 − p99) -1.184 2.088 6.085
[14,859] (1.320) (1.924) (3.150)
Large (> p99) -2.699 1.674 10.824
[3,979] (2.170) (3.644) (5.495)
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses.
25Table 4: One–step estimates, univariate model for total loans: sums of coef-
ﬁcients on monetary policy indicator and uncertainty
σ calculated from Size B · MPI σ B · σ
Three–month Small -0.465 0.010 -0.004
Treasury bill (< p95) (0.083) (0.001) (0.002)
Intermediate 0.507 0.016 -0.048
(p95 − p99) (0.777) (0.004) (0.015)
Large -2.177 0.024 -0.086
(> p99) (1.616) (0.006) (0.034)
Five–year Small -0.275 0.027 -0.026
Treasury note (< p95) (0.079) (0.001) (0.004)
Intermediate 1.307 0.059 -0.181
(p95 − p99) (0.766) (0.010) (0.036)
Large -1.414 0.066 -0.201
(> p99) (1.530) (0.015) (0.077)
Three month Small -0.542 0.007 -0.004
commercial paper– (< p95) (0.081) (0.000) (0.001)
Tbill spread Intermediate 0.712 0.011 -0.037
(p95 − p99) (0.756) 0.003) (0.012)
Large -2.022 0.018 -0.072
(> p99) (1.607) (0.005) (0.029)
Ten year– Small -0.385 0.020 -0.013
One year (< p95) (0.082) (0.001) (0.004)
Treasury spread Intermediate 1.206 0.037 -0.132
(p95 − p99) (0.785) (0.010) (0.033)
Large -1.942 0.047 -0.188
(> p99) (1.650) (0.015) (0.082)
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses.
26Table 5: One–step estimates, univariate model for total loans: sums of coef-
ﬁcients on monetary policy indicator and uncertainty
σ calculated from Size B · MPI σ B · σ
Three–month Small0 (< p25) -0.816 0.009 0.004
Treasury bill (0.158) (0.001) (0.003)
Small1 (p25 − p50) -0.619 0.011 -0.004
(0.144) (0.001) (0.003)
Small2 (p50 − p75) -0.425 0.011 -0.009
(0.155) (0.001) (0.003)
Small3 (p75 − p95) -0.022 0.012 -0.020
(0.227) (0.002) (0.005)
Five–year Small0 (< p25) -0.570 0.023 -0.007
Treasury note (0.151) (0.003) (0.008)
Small1 (p25 − p50) -0.467 0.029 -0.024
(0.766) (0.003) (0.007)
Small2 (p50 − p75) -0.283 0.030 -0.037
(0.149) (0.003) (0.007)
Small3 (p75 − p95) 0.193 0.034 -0.070
(0.219) (0.004) (0.011)
Three month Small0 (< p25) -0.837 0.007 0.002
commercial paper–Tbill (0.154) (0.001) (0.003)
spread Small1 (p25 − p50) -0.716 0.009 -0.004
(0.142) 0.001) (0.002)
Small2 (p50 − p75) -0.520 0.009 -0.008
(0.150) (0.001) (0.002)
Small3 (p75 − p95) -0.141 0.009 -0.016
(0.220) (0.001) (0.004)
Ten year–One year Small0 (< p25) -0.701 0.019 -0.000
Treasury spread (0.156) (0.003) (0.008)
Small1 (p25 − p50) -0.562 0.024 -0.012
(0.143) (0.003) (0.007)
Small2 (p50 − p75) -0.362 0.022 -0.021
(0.152) (0.002) (0.007)
Small3 (p75 − p95) 0.117 0.024 -0.050
(0.228) (0.003) (0.010)
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses.
27Table 6: Univariate model for total loans: Total eﬀect of σ for quartiles of B
Bp25 Bp50 Bp75 Total[σ|Bp25] Total[σ|Bp50] Total[σ|Bp75]
small 0.2300 0.3200 0.4300 0.0091 0.0088 0.0084
small0 0.2400 0.3400 0.4600 0.0098 0.0103 0.0108
small1 0.2400 0.3300 0.4400 0.0104 0.0100 0.0096
small2 0.2400 0.3300 0.4300 0.0091 0.0083 0.0074
small3 0.2100 0.2900 0.3800 0.0074 0.0059 0.0041
intermediate 0.1600 0.2400 0.3300 0.0078 0.0040 0.0000
large 0.1200 0.1800 0.2400 0.0138 0.0083 0.0029
Note: italicized entries are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at 5%.
28Table 7: One–step estimates, bivariate model for total loans: sums of coeﬃ-
cients on monetary policy indicator, GDP growth, and uncertainty
σ calculated from Size B · MPI B · GDP σ B · σ
Three–month Small -0.480 -0.989 0.012 -0.005
Treasury bill (< p95) (0.120) (0.215) (0.001) (0.002)
Intermediate 2.679 5.338 0.018 -0.032
(p95 − p99) (1.063) (1.923) (0.005) (0.016)
Large 0.860 6.298 0.033 -0.086
(> p99) (2.238) (3.852) (0.007) (0.037)
Five–year Small -0.271 -0.711 0.032 -0.025
Treasury note (< p95) (0.111) (0.199) (0.002) (0.004)
Intermediate 3.293 5.443 0.061 -0.134
(p95 − p99) (1.019) (1.833) (0.011) (0.038)
Large 1.440 6.604 0.093 -0.231
(> p99) (2.069) (3.556) (0.016) (0.082)
Three month Small -0.608 -1.038 0.009 -0.004
commercial paper– (< p95) (0.118) (0.216) (0.001) (0.002)
Tbill spread Intermediate 2.908 5.488 0.013 -0.023
(p95 − p99) (1.050) (1.941) 0.004) (0.013)
Large 1.369 7.578 0.024 -0.067
(> p99) (2.240) (3.931) (0.006) (0.031)
Ten year– Small -0.513 -1.004 0.029 -0.017
One year (< p95) (0.115) (0.220) (0.002) (0.004)
Treasury spread Intermediate 3.281 5.615 0.043 -0.080
(p95 − p99) (1.036) (1.986) (0.011) (0.037)
Large 0.695 5.860 0.069 -0.166
(> p99) (2.171) (4.005) (0.017) (0.092)
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses.
29Table 8: One–step estimates, bivariate model for total loans: sums of coeﬃ-
cients on monetary policy indicator, GDP growth, and uncertainty
σ calculated from Size B · MPI B · GDP σ B · σ
Three–month Small0 (< p25) -0.674 -0.224 0.009 0.005
Treasury bill (0.220) (0.396) (0.001) (0.004)
Small1 (p25 − p50) -0.719 -1.171 0.014 -0.006
(0.201) (0.366) (0.001) (0.003)
Small2 (p50 − p75) -0.436 -0.998 0.014 -0.009
(0.221) (0.385) (0.001) (0.003)
Small3 (p75 − p95) 0.539 0.120 0.014 -0.016
(0.347) (0.615) (0.002) (0.005)
Five–year Small0 (< p25) -0.370 0.126 0.024 -0.003
Treasury note (0.203) (0.371) (0.003) (0.008)
Small1 (p25 − p50) -0.531 -0.963 0.034 -0.027
(0.187) (0.343) (0.003) (0.008)
Small2 (p50 − p75) -0.259 -0.699 0.036 -0.036
(0.203) (0.357) (0.003) (0.008)
Small3 (p75 − p95) 0.614 0.318 0.039 -0.058
(0.319) (0.566) (0.004) (0.121)
Three month Small0 (< p25) -0.739 -0.200 0.007 -0.003
commercial paper– (0.216) (0.397) (0.001) (0.003)
Tbill spread Small1 (p25 − p50) -0.857 -1.253 0.010 -0.005
(0.198) (0.367) 0.001) (0.013)
Small2 (p50 − p75) -0.594 -1.089 0.011 -0.008
(0.218) (0.390) (0.001) (0.003)
Small3 (p75 − p95) 0.364 -0.005 0.011 -0.013
(0.340) (0.617) (0.001) (0.004)
Ten year– Small0 (< p25) -0.719 -0.259 0.022 0.000
One year (0.208) (0.405) (0.003) 0.008)
Treasury spread Small1 (p25 − p50) -0.778 -1.244 0.032 -0.020
(0.191) (0.375) (0.003) (0.008)
Small2 (p50 − p75) -0.470 -1.003 0.031 -0.024
(0.210) (0.395) (0.003) (0.008)
Small3 (p75 − p95) 0.494 0.030 0.034 -0.043
(0.333) (0.636) (0.004) (0.012)
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses.
30Table 9: Bivariate model for total loans: Total eﬀect of σ for quartiles of B
Bp25 Bp50 Bp75 Total[σ|Bp25] Total[σ|Bp50] Total[σ|Bp75]
small 0.2300 0.3200 0.4300 0.0112 0.0108 0.0103
small0 0.2400 0.3400 0.4600 0.0104 0.0109 0.0114
small1 0.2400 0.3300 0.4400 0.0121 0.0116 0.0109
small2 0.2400 0.3300 0.4300 0.0116 0.0107 0.0097
small3 0.2100 0.2900 0.3800 0.0108 0.0096 0.0081
intermediate 0.1600 0.2400 0.3300 0.0125 0.0100 0.0072
large 0.1200 0.1800 0.2400 0.0224 0.0169 0.0115
31Table 10: One–step estimates, bivariate model for C&I loans: sums of coef-
ﬁcients on monetary policy indicator, GDP growth, and uncertainty
σ calculated from Size B · MPI B · GDP σ B · σ
Three–month Small 0.748 2.750 0.044 -0.037
Treasury bill (< p95) (0.504) (0.844) (0.002) (0.007)
Intermediate 2.432 4.272 0.036 -0.053
(p95 − p99) (3.014) (5.236) (0.010) (0.039)
Large 1.284 6.167 0.054 -0.080
(> p99) (4.651) (7.818) (0.012) (0.057)
Five–year Small -0.087 1.985 0.106 -0.096
Treasury note (< p95) (0.442) (0.786) (0.005) (0.016)
Intermediate 3.517 6.337 0.100 -0.152
(p95 − p99) (2.459) (4.725) (0.023) (0.094)
Large 1.571 4.337 0.142 -0.262
(> p99) (4.240) (7.235) (0.027) (0.132)
Three month Small 0.534 2.296 0.033 -0.028
commercial paper– (< p95) (0.491) (0.832) (0.002) (0.006)
Tbill spread Intermediate 3.033 5.554 0.026 -0.037
(p95 − p99) (2.963) (5.144) (0.008) (0.030)
Large 1.928 7.437 0.041 -0.057
(> p99) (4.640) (7.997) (0.009) (0.045)
Ten year– Small 0.470 2.279 0.096 -0.078
One year (< p95) (0.471) (0.858) (0.005) (0.016)
Treasury spread Intermediate 1.901 4.303 0.080 -0.109
(p95 − p99) (2.799) (5.311) (0.022) (0.093)
Large 0.852 3.754 0.127 -0.191
(> p99) (4.498) (8.265) (0.027) (0.134)
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses.
32Table 11: One–step estimates, bivariate model for C&I loans: sums of coef-
ﬁcients on monetary policy indicator, GDP growth, and uncertainty
σ calculated from Size B · MPI B · GDP σ B · σ
Three–month Small0 (< p25) -1.004 0.690 0.054 -0.048
Treasury bill (1.178) (1.896) (0.006) (0.016)
Small1 (p25 − p50) -0.566 -0.382 0.044 -0.032
(0.903) (1.517) (0.004) (0.013)
Small2 (p50 − p75) 0.321 3.356 0.042 -0.037
(0.936) (1.585) (0.004) (0.013)
Small3 (p75 − p95) 4.400 7.751 0.046 -0.063
(1.054) (1.854) (0.005) (0.015)
Five–year Small0 (< p25) -1.210 1.554 0.119 -0.101
Treasury note (1.012) (1.762) (0.013) (0.036)
Small1 (p25 − p50) -1.293 -1.043 0.099 -0.079
(0.795) (1.407) (0.010) (0.029)
Small2 (p50 − p75) -0.737 2.575 0.104 -0.099
(0.825) (1.472) (0.010) (0.031)
Small3 (p75 − p95) 2.701 5.520 0.120 -0.168
(0.913) (1.738) (0.011) (0.035)
Three month Small0 (< p25) -1.135 0.543 0.041 -0.038
commercial paper– (1.139) (1.867) (0.004) (0.012)
Tbill spread Small1 (p25 − p50) -1.032 -1.242 0.034 -0.026
(0.881) (1.488) (0.003) (0.010)
Small2 (p50 − p75) -0.014 2.674 0.032 -0.030
(0.918) (1.565) (0.003) (0.010)
Small3 (p75 − p95) 4.295 7.532 0.033 -0.045
(1.031) (1.829) (0.004) (0.012)
Ten year– Small0 (< p25) -1.457 0.537 0.118 -0.104
One year (1.086) (1.900) (0.013) (0.035)
Treasury spread Small1 (p25 − p50) -1.030 -1.190 0.099 -0.075
(0.847) (1.527) (0.010) (0.029)
Small2 (p50 − p75) 0.103 2.399 0.092 -0.083
(0.890) (1.632) (0.010) (0.031)
Small3 (p75 − p95) 4.057 6.742 0.100 -0.130
(0.976) (1.912) (0.010) (0.035)
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses.
33Table 12: Bivariate model for C&I loans: Total eﬀect of σ for quartiles of B
Bp25 Bp50 Bp75 Total[σ|Bp25] Total[σ|Bp50] Total[σ|Bp75]
small 0.2300 0.3200 0.4100 0.0356 0.0325 0.0290
small0 0.2400 0.3400 0.4500 0.0426 0.0382 0.0330
small1 0.2400 0.3200 0.4200 0.0362 0.0335 0.0303
small2 0.2300 0.3100 0.4000 0.0330 0.0300 0.0267
small3 0.2100 0.2900 0.3700 0.0327 0.0279 0.0227
intermediate 0.1800 0.2500 0.3200 0.0267 0.0230 0.0190
large 0.1200 0.1700 0.2400 0.0443 0.0399 0.0348
34